Superb. I've reread and will reread again. I have similar concerns about this broader subject but coming from the non-military angle. That said, as I read your post a passage came immediately to mind. "It is necessary to remember, in the first place, that this war is not one that is being fought by the military forces alone. There are economic, psychologic, social, political and even literary forces engaged, and it is necessary for us in order to defeat the enemy, to understand fully the strength of each. Nor can the investigation stop with the forces of the enemy: it must extend to each country in the world and to every people. The question of winning the war is far too complicated and far too delicate to be answered by a study of only the powers and resources of the nations in arms." This was written 106 years ago by Military Intelligence Division of the War Department's General Staff (US, of course; this was part of the War College at the time). Perhaps understandably, the Prussian isn't mention anywhere. They do, to your point, acknowledge the tactical and strategic study of war requires more than focusing on the military component. Related to the work that produced the report the passage above is from is another report from the War College, and thus the General Staff, early the same year (1918) that recognized that in the "strategic equation" of war there are four factors—combat, economic, political, and psychologic—and that the last of these is coequal with the others. That report also noted, as described in the book Words that Won the War by Mock and Larson (1939), "the Germans had long recognized this, the report continued, the Allies and America had been inclined to belittle the importance of the psychologic factor, thus making the other branches carry an unnecessarily heavy burden. The memorandum held that to attack the enemy's political homogeneity and national morale it was necessary first to discover his points of political and social weakness." I'm by no means an expert in strategic studies, but it seems to me there are hints that understanding of the problem you described was there and then forgotten.
Excellent article. I am reminded of the historical phrase "the strong do what they will, the weak suffer what they must." Your observations on the lack of proper Clausewitz translations is well noted, especially since On War is the text that is so widely studied and cited. The causes of war are founded on a myriad of factors which politicians exploit to serve their own ends. In hindsight few historians pay attention to all those same factors when shaping the future narrative. The study history of with a single isolated lens is a very dangerous enterprise.
Excellent article a well overdue observation and very much on point.
This is exactly why the US hasn't won any of its major military conflicts since ww2.
They forgot that the role of the military is as a political instrument.
( possibly due to US hubris due to having such massive military and economic resources )
The role of the military is to achieve a political outcome via force of arms that can't be achieved via diplomacy or other means.
The US has failed to understand or focus on realistic political strategy. Or understand where the political centre of gravity in these countries are.
Instead they try and impose military/ tactical solutions. That's why they are losing in Ukraine, and will also lose when / if they fight in iran and taiwan.
The role of the military of the military as a political tool was not implemented
US has forgotten to understand this... in Japan and Germany, they co-opted both the emperor, and bureaucracy and elites including many nazis and Japanese elites into their new government. These had support of most of the people.
In Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, cuba etc they tried to work with puppets and outliers to build an artificial power base. Of course it Failed.
All these countries had/ have political centres of gravity that the US refused to co-opt. They instead thought they could create their own power base via force of arms.
But without legitimacy in the eyes of the people this failed.
I would disagree somewhat that tactics need to be understood to have a realistic achievable political strategy. They obviously are very important as the correct tactics will be needed to win eg: insurgent tactics for the Vietnamese or Taliban.
But the tactics are a separate study from the politics.
Insightful piece, B.A. Your argument that strategic studies often ignores tactics, thereby misunderstanding the whole of war as Clausewitz intended, is critical. This resonates with the challenge of analyzing modern military forces; for example, understanding PLA strategic intent requires a deep dive into its C4ISR and joint operational concepts--the very mechanisms that bridge Beijing's strategic goals to tactical execution. As I explore in my Substack 'Orders and Observations' (https://ordersandobservations.substack.com/), without grasping how PLA C4ISR enables (or constrains) its joint operations and long-range strike planning, our strategic assessments risk being detached from reality. A crucial reminder to connect the 'how' with the 'what' and 'why'.
I think the artificial separation is almost by design.
By decoupling war from its context, it narrows down the responsibility of the professional military strategists (GOs), granting them the historical excuse to toss the blame of failure to the political structure as those holding the means to reach the end.
Never mind means are not infinite, and that strategy was supposed to be the very skill of understanding the available means and find a way to successfully reach the ends...
Great article. I can't imagine how Biddle, let alone Clausewitz, have salience in current politics. And in my neck of the woods, we argue Jomini versus Clausewitz and how their thoughts were mangled in the 19th century. Oh the crucial role of translators.
I’m completely on board with his analysis. A few years back I wrote an article for Divergent Options about how Afghanistan might have been handled better with a smaller military foot print and more emphasis on influence and doing deals with people who were 51% on our side. For all the money wasted in A-stan we could have had influence operations in every major hot spot in the world…You also have to HAVE a clear strategic plan and work it over a number of years. But I have to admit too…That’s my field so I see a lot of undeveloped and unused leverage…My viewpoint isn’t the norm, but thanks for posting this…At least I’m not alone…
Made me think: rightly, US has realized an international power primacy strategy, international rules, Liberalism ; secondary strategy, mutual restraints on power, Republicanism. Could strategy vis a vis Ukraine Russia been an attempt to realize mutual restraints on power, Republicanism? Possibly fighting war without actual violence?
Excellent piece！ However, IMHO, your portraying of Biddle’s latest piece might be little bit biased. For he explicitly discussed the political assumptions underneath a deep strike-centered strategy and dedicated a whole section of his article on it. His argument draws heavily from the discussions regarding strategic bombing and its strategic/ political effectives (or lack thereof). AFAIK, essential works in this field like “bombing to win” does not neglect the political side of military strategy either, rather it is the whole point of it! We might argue that he should elaborate more on his own political presumptions and be more cautious of drawing comparisons between historical cases and the current battlefield, but I believe he didn’t commit the crime you made an example out of him.
I’m a big Biddle fan, but I disagree. He discussed it in terms of the political assumptions of strategic bombing theory which is not the same thing as the specific political dynamics of the current conflict.
I agree to some extent: he should not readily make a direct comparison of the strategic bombing vs. the current situation. At least he should provide more caveats than he did. However, this only further demonstrates that the potential problem with Biddle’s analysis is not that he sees the operational and tactical levels of war as an isolated field from the wider political one. His argument that highlights the tradeoff between different of munitions provided under a strict funding cap is strictly a political one.
I believe that someone from the German General Staff (choose the war you wish after 1871) would have argued the tactics point vigorously. They didn't have to worry about translation of Clausewitz. One presumes they understood his text in its original language, unfinished as it may have been.
Napoleon did not care about tactics much either, aside from a vague preference for l'ordre mixte. That was a task for his subordinates.
Studies of industrial policy, diplomacy and internal politics of various nations have a very wide scope. The last unitary state basically was Napoleon's Empire, and he ultimately failed at conducting operations with himself as a central, required figure, as skilled as he might have been. Since then, it's a bureaucracy in every nation that conducts its operations.
The utility of some Renaissance man who understands everything seems obvious, but it also doesn't seem possible or useful in today's environment. Having a bit of experience in the area, a military leader who understood those other facets very well probably wouldn't be a very good military leader. Only the Great Captains measured up in this regard. Most GOs I have known were rather one-dimensional.
The Clausewitz translation amounting to war being a continuation of politics through other means seems like a good point to cede responsibility to civilians. The fact that this is true in every nation I am aware of also lends itself to the clean break. US ineffectiveness in recent conflicts has to do with the use which military force has been put to, rather than some failure in its leadership in theater. Not to say that has always been perfect, but I can say the same about every nation in every conflict.
In a nutshell, strategy doesn't have an answer if the politics leading to the application of force are bad.
Superb. I've reread and will reread again. I have similar concerns about this broader subject but coming from the non-military angle. That said, as I read your post a passage came immediately to mind. "It is necessary to remember, in the first place, that this war is not one that is being fought by the military forces alone. There are economic, psychologic, social, political and even literary forces engaged, and it is necessary for us in order to defeat the enemy, to understand fully the strength of each. Nor can the investigation stop with the forces of the enemy: it must extend to each country in the world and to every people. The question of winning the war is far too complicated and far too delicate to be answered by a study of only the powers and resources of the nations in arms." This was written 106 years ago by Military Intelligence Division of the War Department's General Staff (US, of course; this was part of the War College at the time). Perhaps understandably, the Prussian isn't mention anywhere. They do, to your point, acknowledge the tactical and strategic study of war requires more than focusing on the military component. Related to the work that produced the report the passage above is from is another report from the War College, and thus the General Staff, early the same year (1918) that recognized that in the "strategic equation" of war there are four factors—combat, economic, political, and psychologic—and that the last of these is coequal with the others. That report also noted, as described in the book Words that Won the War by Mock and Larson (1939), "the Germans had long recognized this, the report continued, the Allies and America had been inclined to belittle the importance of the psychologic factor, thus making the other branches carry an unnecessarily heavy burden. The memorandum held that to attack the enemy's political homogeneity and national morale it was necessary first to discover his points of political and social weakness." I'm by no means an expert in strategic studies, but it seems to me there are hints that understanding of the problem you described was there and then forgotten.
Excellent article. I am reminded of the historical phrase "the strong do what they will, the weak suffer what they must." Your observations on the lack of proper Clausewitz translations is well noted, especially since On War is the text that is so widely studied and cited. The causes of war are founded on a myriad of factors which politicians exploit to serve their own ends. In hindsight few historians pay attention to all those same factors when shaping the future narrative. The study history of with a single isolated lens is a very dangerous enterprise.
Excellent article a well overdue observation and very much on point.
This is exactly why the US hasn't won any of its major military conflicts since ww2.
They forgot that the role of the military is as a political instrument.
( possibly due to US hubris due to having such massive military and economic resources )
The role of the military is to achieve a political outcome via force of arms that can't be achieved via diplomacy or other means.
The US has failed to understand or focus on realistic political strategy. Or understand where the political centre of gravity in these countries are.
Instead they try and impose military/ tactical solutions. That's why they are losing in Ukraine, and will also lose when / if they fight in iran and taiwan.
The role of the military of the military as a political tool was not implemented
US has forgotten to understand this... in Japan and Germany, they co-opted both the emperor, and bureaucracy and elites including many nazis and Japanese elites into their new government. These had support of most of the people.
In Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, cuba etc they tried to work with puppets and outliers to build an artificial power base. Of course it Failed.
All these countries had/ have political centres of gravity that the US refused to co-opt. They instead thought they could create their own power base via force of arms.
But without legitimacy in the eyes of the people this failed.
I would disagree somewhat that tactics need to be understood to have a realistic achievable political strategy. They obviously are very important as the correct tactics will be needed to win eg: insurgent tactics for the Vietnamese or Taliban.
But the tactics are a separate study from the politics.
Insightful piece, B.A. Your argument that strategic studies often ignores tactics, thereby misunderstanding the whole of war as Clausewitz intended, is critical. This resonates with the challenge of analyzing modern military forces; for example, understanding PLA strategic intent requires a deep dive into its C4ISR and joint operational concepts--the very mechanisms that bridge Beijing's strategic goals to tactical execution. As I explore in my Substack 'Orders and Observations' (https://ordersandobservations.substack.com/), without grasping how PLA C4ISR enables (or constrains) its joint operations and long-range strike planning, our strategic assessments risk being detached from reality. A crucial reminder to connect the 'how' with the 'what' and 'why'.
I think the artificial separation is almost by design.
By decoupling war from its context, it narrows down the responsibility of the professional military strategists (GOs), granting them the historical excuse to toss the blame of failure to the political structure as those holding the means to reach the end.
Never mind means are not infinite, and that strategy was supposed to be the very skill of understanding the available means and find a way to successfully reach the ends...
Great article. I can't imagine how Biddle, let alone Clausewitz, have salience in current politics. And in my neck of the woods, we argue Jomini versus Clausewitz and how their thoughts were mangled in the 19th century. Oh the crucial role of translators.
There is, perhaps, another risk namely that the prerequisites of your Strategic Studies are so extensive as to make the subject impossible.
❝The more I study science, the more I believe in God. But psychology is too difficult for me❞ :-)
I’m completely on board with his analysis. A few years back I wrote an article for Divergent Options about how Afghanistan might have been handled better with a smaller military foot print and more emphasis on influence and doing deals with people who were 51% on our side. For all the money wasted in A-stan we could have had influence operations in every major hot spot in the world…You also have to HAVE a clear strategic plan and work it over a number of years. But I have to admit too…That’s my field so I see a lot of undeveloped and unused leverage…My viewpoint isn’t the norm, but thanks for posting this…At least I’m not alone…
Made me think: rightly, US has realized an international power primacy strategy, international rules, Liberalism ; secondary strategy, mutual restraints on power, Republicanism. Could strategy vis a vis Ukraine Russia been an attempt to realize mutual restraints on power, Republicanism? Possibly fighting war without actual violence?
Excellent piece！ However, IMHO, your portraying of Biddle’s latest piece might be little bit biased. For he explicitly discussed the political assumptions underneath a deep strike-centered strategy and dedicated a whole section of his article on it. His argument draws heavily from the discussions regarding strategic bombing and its strategic/ political effectives (or lack thereof). AFAIK, essential works in this field like “bombing to win” does not neglect the political side of military strategy either, rather it is the whole point of it! We might argue that he should elaborate more on his own political presumptions and be more cautious of drawing comparisons between historical cases and the current battlefield, but I believe he didn’t commit the crime you made an example out of him.
I’m a big Biddle fan, but I disagree. He discussed it in terms of the political assumptions of strategic bombing theory which is not the same thing as the specific political dynamics of the current conflict.
I agree to some extent: he should not readily make a direct comparison of the strategic bombing vs. the current situation. At least he should provide more caveats than he did. However, this only further demonstrates that the potential problem with Biddle’s analysis is not that he sees the operational and tactical levels of war as an isolated field from the wider political one. His argument that highlights the tradeoff between different of munitions provided under a strict funding cap is strictly a political one.
Thank you for this.
I believe that someone from the German General Staff (choose the war you wish after 1871) would have argued the tactics point vigorously. They didn't have to worry about translation of Clausewitz. One presumes they understood his text in its original language, unfinished as it may have been.
Napoleon did not care about tactics much either, aside from a vague preference for l'ordre mixte. That was a task for his subordinates.
Studies of industrial policy, diplomacy and internal politics of various nations have a very wide scope. The last unitary state basically was Napoleon's Empire, and he ultimately failed at conducting operations with himself as a central, required figure, as skilled as he might have been. Since then, it's a bureaucracy in every nation that conducts its operations.
The utility of some Renaissance man who understands everything seems obvious, but it also doesn't seem possible or useful in today's environment. Having a bit of experience in the area, a military leader who understood those other facets very well probably wouldn't be a very good military leader. Only the Great Captains measured up in this regard. Most GOs I have known were rather one-dimensional.
The Clausewitz translation amounting to war being a continuation of politics through other means seems like a good point to cede responsibility to civilians. The fact that this is true in every nation I am aware of also lends itself to the clean break. US ineffectiveness in recent conflicts has to do with the use which military force has been put to, rather than some failure in its leadership in theater. Not to say that has always been perfect, but I can say the same about every nation in every conflict.
In a nutshell, strategy doesn't have an answer if the politics leading to the application of force are bad.