On Naval Doctrine II

Moving on

This post continues where the previous one left off and covers more modern writers on doctrine, some of whom focus on naval doctrine and others who have a broader lens.

Barry Posen

Barry Posen treats military doctrine as a subcomponent of grand strategy that, “deals explicitly with military means,” especially what military means are necessary and how they are employed.[1] He lays out three possible military doctrines. An offensive doctrine intends “to disarm an adversary- to destroy his armed forces.”[2] A defensive doctrine is used to “deny an adversary the objective he seeks.”[3] Lastly, deterrent doctrines are used to “punish an aggressor- to raise his costs without reference to reducing one’s own.”[4] He also describes them in terms of innovation versus stagnation i.e. whether the doctrine is adapted to a new situation or whether it is stagnant. Posen’s description of doctrine focuses on the tactical system of a military service with little focus on command philosophies.

There are a number of problems with this conception. First, describing doctrines as merely offensive, defensive, or deterrent ignores a vast number of other ways doctrine may be characterized, such as compellence. Secondly, it simplifies doctrine to the point where components of a doctrine are ignored, especially where doctrines can be employed for offensive, defense, or deterrent ends. Third, it implies that innovation is always beneficial, and stagnation is always detrimental. If a stagnant doctrine is so because it is effective and appropriate to the institution’s strategic context, changing it for the sake of innovation could be disastrous. Fifth, defining doctrine only by their strategic purpose (offensive, defensive, or deterrent) risks conflating strategy and doctrine as the same thing.

Nevertheless, Posen’s examination of doctrine from the point of view of grand strategy is useful as it highlights strategy as an important contextual component of doctrine and its development. Doctrine must be judged by its effectiveness in terms of achieving or failing to achieve a state’s strategy which is its purpose.

John Gooch

In 1997, John Gooch examined doctrine from the point of view of how it was created, not why it should be. Gooch proposed six components of doctrine:

• The Nature of Weapons Technology

• The Influence of Formative Experience

• Organizational and Institutional Interests

• Ideology

• National Culture

• The Political and Strategic Situation

These are the ingredients that go into the creation of doctrine, but do not adequately describe what the product becomes when forged by a particular military organization. There really isn’t much to say about this one, I think Gooch pretty much nailed the ingredients.

Colin Gray

Doctrine is the subject of Colin S. Gray’s “Dictum Twenty” in his seminal work, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice. That dictum is, “Strategy is the most fundamental source of military doctrine, while doctrine is a notable enabler of, and guide for, strategies.”[5] This is an interactive relationship, rather than just a dictatorial one where strategy determines doctrine.

Gray further explains that “It is the nature of doctrine, in contrast to the nature of strategy, to specify how tasks set at different levels of military inclusiveness can best be accomplished.”[6] Again, there is a greater specificity to doctrine than strategy, one that cannot be captured in just matters of offense, defense, or deterrence.

In this way, Gray directly takes on the question of what doctrine is used for. He explains: “First, doctrine provides a common basis of understanding of what its issuing organization currently believes to be best military practice… Second, doctrine provides guidance, in some military cultures it provides mandatory guidance, not merely strong suggestions, on how soldiers should proceed on the basis of lessons learnt from historical experience, sometimes on the basis only of deduction from first principles, while occasionally it reflects nothing more solid than the commander’s intuition. Third, doctrine both tells a military institution what it wants to believe, and it tells the outside world what it wants that world to believe, about the institution’s relative importance, roles, and military behaviour. Fourth, doctrine is essential for the enculturation, truly the indoctrination, of its junior members.”[7] This aptly covers doctrine’s purpose as authorized institutional teaching, inclusive of but more expansive than merely the written official documents of a particular military service.

Gray sums up the interactive nature of doctrine and strategy: “Strategy and doctrine, doctrine and strategy, are necessary partners. Strategy decides how policy’s goals are to be advanced and secured, and it selects the instrumental objectives to achieve those goals. Military doctrine, for its vital part, explains how armed forces of different kinds should fight.”[8] Doctrine takes its direction from strategy, but its necessary function is the explication of a tactical system that can, in theory, achieve the strategy.

However, this does not always happen. Gray states: “Doctrine should be the subordinated party to strategy in their necessary partnership, but such is by no means always the case.”[9] He cites the strategic bombing doctrine in use by both British and American air forces during World War II who were guided more by their pre-existing doctrinal preferences than any real strategic direction.

From Clausewitz, we get the idea that doctrine is not theory. From Gray, we get the idea that doctrine is also not strategy. It is in between theory and strategy and lays out a path, a tactical system or methodology that leads to a strategic effect. This linking function of doctrine was addressed by Geoffrey Sloan.

Geoffrey Sloan

From Clausewitz, we can take the delineation of doctrine from theory. From Corbett and Knox, we can take its animating role in the execution of tactics. From Gray and to a lesser extent Posen, we can take why strategy determines the goals of doctrine and how doctrine should supply a method to strategic effect. From Gooch, we can take the ingredients of a doctrine. But we still lack a view of how it is forged.

Geoffrey Sloan has tackled this need in two works. First, in Military Doctrine, Command Philosophy, and the Generation of Fighting Power: Genesis and Theory (2012) Sloan defined doctrine as “Doctrine can also be understood as a set of corporate beliefs, or the principles which guide an organization on how it interacts with a wider environment.”[10] This is a greater elucidation of Knox’s conception of doctrine as “a governing idea.”

Sloan also directly addressed Clausewitz’s critical question, concluding that doctrine is connected with how military forces answer it. This echo’s Knox’s analysis that concludes that first a service must develop “a conception of war” and proceed from there to the development of doctrine.[11]

He also describes doctrine as a way to “embody the vital link between theory and practice.”[12] This bridges the gap between theory and doctrine that Clausewitz and others left unaddressed.

Importantly, Sloan recognizes that the command philosophy is not separate but an integral part of a doctrine. It is inseparable due to the importance not just of what should be done in war but also who should decide what should be done. How military forces address Knox’s challenges of command is a vital part of their doctrine: “Doctrine and command philosophy are like two halves of a banknote; each is useless without the other.”[13]

Sloan identified two major variants of command philosophy: centralized and decentralized command: “The first variant can be described as centralized control. The German word Befehlstaktik (orders-based tactics) refers to this concept. This restrictive approach informs the command chain why, when and, critically, how operations will be carried out. The second variant is often referred to in German as Auftragstaktik (mission-based tactics). This approach informs the command chain why and when operations will be carried out, but, critically, delegates the ‘how’ to the initiative of officers in the command structure.”[14] These two variants exist on a spectrum and specific military organizations will prefer more or less centralization. This preference is not just a factor in an organization’s doctrine but rather a vital component thereof: doctrine cannot be understood absent the command philosophy.

In essence, doctrine performs a linking function between strategy and tactics that influences both of them, an issue unaddressed by Knox and Posen: “Doctrine performs different, but linked, functions at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. At the strategic level, doctrine provides direction and understanding; at the operational level, doctrine provides understanding and instruction; and at the tactical level, doctrine provides instruction and training.”[15]

After further defining Gooch’s components of doctrine at various levels and highlighting the importance of command philosophy, Sloan examined how the Royal Navy created and promulgated doctrine in The Chemistry of Doctrine: The Royal Navy’s Approach since the Seventeenth Century. Sloan found the existence of a doctrinal triptych consisting of three components of transmission: 1) actions that naval officers were taught to take instinctively by senior officers; 2) fighting instructions, written guidelines promulgated by fleet commanders; and 3) official codified doctrine promulgated by the Admiralty staff.[16]

The Royal Navy’s doctrine in the time period covered by Sloan answered all of the questions raised by above: it included corporate beliefs about the nature of specific wars it expected to fight, answering Clausewitz’s critical question. It provided the “soul” of Royal Navy warfare by describing and disseminating a preferred tactical system that fit both its ends and means and its identity as an institution. It included a governing idea a la Knox that provided cohesion and harmony across the Royal Navy. The doctrine also guided how the Royal Navy would pursue the strategy of the moment a la Posen, and provided a methodology to link tactics and strategy. Lastly, it performed the function of linking theory and practice described by Sloan.

Thus far, we have ascertained that doctrine is distinct from theory, although theory provides a guide to its creation. We’ve ascertained that it is the soul and animating force of tactical execution, operational organization, and strategic direction, as well as its function bridging the gap between theory and practice. We’ve also ascertained the ingredients that go into doctrine and an example of how it can be promulgated throughout a military force in the Royal Navy’s traditions, fighting instructions, and codified preferences. What remains missing is the process of creation over time, the forging of the ingredients into a weapon.

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[1] Posen, 13.

[2] Posen, 14.

[3] Posen, 14.

[4] Posen, 14.

[5] Gray, The Strategy Bridge, 76.

[6] Gray, 77.

[7] Gray, 77.

[8] Gray, 78.

[9] Gray, The Strategy Bridge, 78.

[10] Sloan, Military Doctrine, 244.

[11] Knox, 71.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Sloan, Military Doctrine, 263.

[14] Sloan, Military Doctrine, 246.

[15] Sloan, Military Doctrine, 245.

[16] Sloan, Chemistry, 4.