On Naval Doctrine I

More Naval Gazing

Expect a lot fewer posts from here on out, probably for the rest of the year. Writing projects for both work and school are coming to a head so my writing dance card is full up. This post is only possible because work I’m doing anyway for school produced it.

Lately I was assigned what amounts to a deep dive on what naval doctrine actually is. Doctrine here is not used in the American sense that solely describes the written doctrinal publications. Rather, doctrine here carries a broader conception inclusive of written doctrine but all the institutional traditions, habits, norms, training, education, and preferences that a military service carries with it into battle, deliberately or not. Doctrine in this sense is more like a “way of war” that is more common among American academics, the most well-known version of this is Russel Weigley’s The American Way of War. The word doctrine comes from the Latin doctrina- to teach- and while members of a military organization are certainly taught codified doctrinal manuals they are also taught a lot more besides.

While Weigley looked at the doctrine of a specific state, my research is about the development of Anglo-American amphibious warfare doctrine. It’s narrower in the sense that I’m only looking at a subset of warfare even if that will span two states (because my hypothesis is that the Royal Navy and Royal Army developed an amphibious warfare doctrine which was then passed to their American allies).

But before I get to that I need to define what doctrine even is, and that’s what this survey is about. I’ll survey major works on naval doctrine and synthesize them, then discuss that synthesis. Part I will cover three older theorists, part II more modern academics, and part III will attempt at a synthesis. I say attempt because I’m not there yet and don’t have a clear idea what it will look like. I normally use links instead of footnotes but these will be footnoted for the sake of saving time.

This survey begins with Clausewitz, always a good place to start. On War looms so large over the profession of strategic studies because it is nearly unique as a definitional work. Contrary to popular belief it is not a book about strategy (hence the title On WAR). It’s a philosophical examination of what war is, along with what its vital components are. He does not define doctrine at any point, even though he discusses it. He discusses it in an extended elucidation of what theory is and he stridently states that theory is not and should not become doctrine. Theory should inform doctrine, but that’s as far as theory goes: it guides preparation for war by influencing both doctrine and war plans. It doesn’t go to war, its students do.

Doctrine is developed by military organizations to answer, in part, Clausewitz’s critical question. That question is presented in book I, chapter I of On War: “Now, the first, the grandest, and most decisive act of judgment which the Statesman and the General exercises is rightly to understand in this respect the War in which he engages, not to take it for something or to wish to make of it something, which by the nature of its relations it is impossible for it to be.”[1]

Policymakers must make an attempt to answer this question as wars have an individual nature of their own. Military services must also make this judgment. Preparing to fight the wrong war tends to lead to failure. Services develop doctrines in order to succeed in their assigned missions.

Clausewitz lists a number of supposedly universal military doctrines in Book II, Chapter II, including numerical superiority, logistics, the use of bases, and interior lines. He dismisses them all as insufficient: “They strive after determinate quantities, whilst in War all is undetermined, and the calculation has always to be made with varying quantities. They direct the attention only upon material forces, while the whole military action is penetrated throughout by intelligent forces and their effects. They only pay regard to activity on one side, whilst War is a constant state of reciprocal action, the effects of which are mutual.”[2] He expounds on these points as three “peculiarities” of war that preclude restrictive theory: “moral forces and their effects,”[3] “living reaction,” and “uncertainty of all data.”[4] He concludes that a theory that covers every eventuality in war is “impossible.”[5]

He then describes two ways out of this dilemma. First, “positive theory” is more possible at a level lower than high command due to the more constricted nature of subordinate elements of a force. “In a word,” he concludes, “it is easier to make a theory for tactics than strategy.”[6]

Second, “theory must of the nature of observation, not of doctrine.”[7] This is one of the few references Clausewitz makes to doctrine as opposed to theory. This phrase begins the section where he argues that theory is more of a guide for education and thought than rules and maxims. In other words, that theory is descriptive not prescriptive, implying that, to Clausewitz, doctrine is prescriptive.  

We can take from this two things: 1) while theory should inform doctrine, it is not in and of itself doctrine; and 2) doctrine is more prescriptive than theory. It exists somewhere between theory and execution but provides more specificity and direction than general theories of war or theories regarding the nature of specific wars.

Julian Corbett

Clausewitz’s dismissal of doctrine in On War- a work of theory- should not be seen as a complete dismissal of the entire idea of doctrine, merely that he thought it was not a function of theory and that theory used as dogmatic doctrine was harmful. That begs a question that Clausewitz left unanswered: what is the role of doctrine as something apart from theory? Corbett, one of Clausewitz’s greatest interpreters, took up this question.

In Principles of Maritime Strategy, Corbett echoes Clausewitz’s view of the role of theory: “Theory is, in fact, a question of education and deliberation, and not of execution at all.”[8] While theory is important, it is doctrine that operates on the events of a war. However, theory has an indirect role on practice: “And this is just what the theoretical study of strategy can do. It can at least determine the normal. By careful collation of past events it becomes clear that certain lines of conduct tend normally to produce certain effects; that wars tend to take certain forms each with a marked idiosyncrasy; that these forms are normally related to the object of the war and to its value to one or both belligerents; that a system of operations which suits one form may not be that best suited to another.”[9] Corbett agrees with Clausewitz that theory is not doctrine and should not be dogmatic, but practice requires a bit more than theory can offer. By informing doctrine, theory indirectly supports execution.

In a 1913 essay called Staff Histories, Corbett’s primary goal was to elucidate the role of staff histories in developing strategy and doctrine. Early in the essay he refers to doctrine as “the soul of warfare.”[10] He does not fully explain what he meant by that, but it is clear that he values doctrine highly as an animating force of strategy.

Dudley Knox

Just a few years later, another naval thinker took on the subject as well. Commodore Dudley Wright Knox, an American sailor and protégé of Captain William S. Sims, USN, wrote The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare for the journal Proceedings.

Knox views doctrine as a way to knit military forces into a cohesive whole: “The navy is comprehending with greater clearness every day, that a fleet is something more than a mere collection of ships; that a bare “ship for ship” superiority over a possible enemy is not a guarantee of victory; that before ships are ready to go into action, no matter how efficient individually, they must be welded into a body, whose various members can be well controlled from a single source and can act collectively as a unit free from embarrassing internal friction; and that the problem of the proper utilization of the ability to steam and to shoot- that is, the problem of command- is not only less elementary but also much more difficult of solution than any yet undertaken by us.”[11]

The chain of command, the hierarchical system of commanders and leaders that characterize most military organizations, is insufficient to create this cohesion: “Moreover in a military organization it is not sufficient that the “officer-body,” which forms the chain of command, shall merely transmit, interpret and execute the order which are received. They must, in war, frequently act on their own initiatives in anticipation of the desires of higher authority.”[12] This is because the leaders simply cannot be everywhere at once and of one mind: “The chief difficulty encountered in the exercise of command is that resulting from a critical situation which imposes upon subordinate commanders the necessity of deciding for themselves the action to be taken, and of carrying their decision into execution, before reference can be made to higher authority.”[13] Knox views such a command philosophy as necessary but not in and of itself a doctrine, which is his next topic.

Knox’s solution to this challenge is doctrine as a way to create cohesion and harmony across a military force through a central “governing idea.” He states, “… there must be a governing idea to which every situation may be referred and from which there may be derived a sound course of action.”[14] Such a governing idea can foster a decentralized command system: “The object of military doctrine is to furnish a basis for prompt and harmonious conduct by the subordinate commanders of a large military force, in accordance with the intentions of the commander-in-chief, but without the necessity for referring each decision to superior authority before action is taken.”[15]

Knox completes his discussion of doctrine with a formal definition: “(a) A military doctrine is distinct from a military principle, rule or method, and has an entirely different military function. (b) Concrete doctrine flows from a conception of war which is based upon a particular alloy of principles. (c) Concrete doctrine gives birth to harmonized methods, rules and actions. (d) Universal understanding and acceptance of common doctrines is necessary before concerted action by a large force engaged in hostilities is possible; it is an indispensable element of command, and an essential prelude to great success in war.”[16]

Despite treating command philosophy and doctrine in the same article, Knox nevertheless sees them as two separate things. Doctrine is an “indispensable element” of command but not the same thing as a command philosophy.

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[1] Clausewitz, On War, Page 18.

[2] Clausewitz, On War, Page 76.

[3] Clausewitz, On War, 78.

[4] Clausewitz, On War, 80.

[5] Clausewitz, On War, 81.

[6] Clausewitz, On War, 81. Italics his.

[7] Clausewitz, On War, 81.

[8] Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy, 3.

[9] Corbett, Principles, 6-7.

[10] Corbett, 96. I consulted 21st Century Corbett for this essay.

[11] Knox, 46. I consulted 21st Century Knox for this essay.

[12] Knox, 48.

[13] Knox, 50.

[14] Knox, 52.

[15] Knox, 53.

[16] Knox, 59.