Future of the Infantry V
Lighten up, Francis
Last week, I looked motorized and mechanized infantry.
This week will have a focus the last of BGEN Wasse de Czege’s three types of infantry, light infantry, which applies to amphibious, airborne, air assault, and Ranger units. I’m going to focus on amphibious forces because that’s my wheelhouse, but a lot of this will apply to all of them. Light infantry is, as its name points out, light. Light infantry has to be ready to make do with what it can carry at least for a time. Even straight leg infantry forces are usually more tied to sustainment than light infantry and can more easily reach back for support. They depend on speed and mobility for effectiveness. Amphibious forces are limited to what can be delivered from the sea, and airborne forces on what can be delivered from the sky, and they expect not to be resupplied for a while.
Uncrewed systems and robotics designed for light infantry will therefore need to be much more heavily focused on single use and expendable systems. They will be able to carry some, but won’t have the infrastructure to reliably recharge, rearm, and maintain them. The dynamics of light infantry will force different priorities for the development and selection of uncrewed systems.
One priority however will be transport, in two forms. One will be load-bearing uncrewed systems that will increase the mobility of light infantry by literally taking some of the load off the individual grunt. There have been experiments with such systems, like robot dogs or mules that as they get better can be expected to find employment with light infantry. Both the Marine Corps and the Army are looking at wheeled systems for this purpose.
Another is mobility for the grunts themselves. These aren’t uncrewed systems themselves but because light infantry depends on mobility and speed, they’ll increasingly need a platform like all-terrain vehicles. The Marine Corps continues to experiment with MRZRs for this reason. This won’t quite give light infantry the options that motorized and mechanized infantry have, but will enable more expendable uncrewed systems.
Light infantry will become more like dragoons: moving mounted and fighting dismounted. Dragoons have a long history, from the Vikings to the New Model Army to American Civil War units like Wilder’s Lightning Brigade (in which one of my ancestors served). Dragoons combined the high mobility of cavalry with the firepower of infantry because they had an organic mobility platform, making them ideally suited for offensive operations while more defensive tasks were left to line infantry forces. This is one of the ways FD2030 is increasing the offensive capabilities of Marine Corps infantry.
One limiting factor in all of this is proclivity, at least for the US forces, to organize all infantry forces the same way regardless of whether they are regular infantry, armored infantry, or light infantry. This made more sense for 20th century, industrial forces but the range of different platforms available to infantry in the 21st century demands a more deliberate and tailored approach, a return to BGEN Wasse de Czege’s prescient definitions.
Regular infantry will face greater threats from drones, but will be limited in terms of what organic drones and counter-drone defenses they will be able to employ, and thus will need support from external units. Armored (motorized and mechanized) infantry will have more options for organic drone and counter-drone capabilities, and therefore will be more suited for offensive roles. Light infantry will also be limited in what can be provided from the air and/or sea, but will have some options for expendables and will need light prime movers to exploit speed as a defensive counter-measure and offensive combat multiplier. These different dynamics will drive different organizations for their squads, companies, battalions, and staffs at the very least. Forced standardization across infantry specialties will limit the potential capability leaps made possible by emerging technologies.
Note for next week: it looks like Ukraine is in the process of withdrawing from Avdiivka as I write. I’ll dive back into the ground war there next post.
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The historical arc of Light Infantry (as compared to "heavy" infantry back in the days of military formal wear on the battlefield) was greater mobility - especially over rougher terrain types; greater precision targeting and firing; greater dispersal to make better use of concealment and cover; and in their highest form - command and initiative were pushed lower down the command ladder so that these troops could be effective even when not in line of sight of the general, colonel, major, etc. So we want to keep and even improve their mobility, provide additional precision fire with the ability to offer heavy fires when needed, reduce their battlefield visibility including minimizing anything that might mark their location, continue training that supports the exercise of initiative at all levels combined with maintaining an essential comms capability when they need to reach back up the chain of command.