The State of FD2030

The Spiciest Force Design Effort

The first Expeditionary Advance Base (EAB) in American history was Great Abaco Island in the Bahamas. There, on or about 1 March 1776, the first Continental Navy squadron and its Continental Marines anchored to complete final preparations for the first amphibious operation in American history. They seized two British coastal vessels and gained insight into what awaited them at New Providence, 50 miles to the south. Two days later, the Continental Marines hit the beach against a totally unprepared British militia force that put up a token resistance.

It was far from the first EAB in history. Seizing advanced naval bases in naval campaigns is so common in military history it likely happened before the widespread use of writing, and so we’ll never know who did it first. Readers of Herodotus may recall that the Persian fleet seized a number of islands in the Aegean Sea on their way to Greece before the Battle of Marathon in 490 BC and used them to support the fleet.

EABs are just any point amphibious forces control for a purpose that will support a naval campaign: fires, communications, sensing, resupply, etc. Stand-In Forces are just forces designed for distributed operations, able to disaggregate to complicate enemy actions designed to counter them. These two pillars of Force Design 2030 are nothing new. The new part is designing forces that can do them in the modern operating environment.

This is just the set the scene for a long-ish piece on Force Design 2030. My day job duties are about to change which will likely preclude commentary on FD2030 for the foreseeable future, so here’s where I sit on it right now. It was triggered by this excellent War On The Rocks piece from a few great guys. I’ll reference it multiple times.

The Zombie Debate

Firstly, that piece is a response to the zombie debate surrounding FD2030. I call it a zombie debate because it’s dead and yet shambling along as if it’s not. While I agree with the writers of the WOTR piece, I’m still not convinced their piece was even necessary. The questions around FD2030 have been asked and answered.

The FD2030 critics have received a fair amount of counter-criticism for voicing their opposition to FD2030. I disagree with this. I don’t think it was wrong at all for them to criticize, and to criticize publicly, the direction of the Marine Corps, even if it turned a lot of HQMC hairs prematurely gray. A culture of passionate debate and open critique is exactly what we want for the Marine Corps. This would never, ever happen in the Army. That doesn’t mean it’s a bad thing.

But, the substance of the criticism has been… let’s just be nice and say lacking. The criticism hinges on a lack of analysis (which is not true, in fact some of the Chowder II members participated in that analysis and did not voice any objection until after it was public), a lack of applicability beyond the Pacific (also not true, the concepts were wargamed and analyzed in a variety of different scenarios, there was even work done on a Caribbean scenario, and they’ve already been executed in Europe), and that the Marine Corps did not go through the proper process for force design (also not true). Being tangentially involved in the early stages, I had a front row seat to how it came about, but Bob Work has also put all these falsehoods to bed.

These are just some of the inaccuracies promulgated by the critics. Other assertions have been proven wrong by subsequent events. But that’s what happens when assertions are made without evidence: one gets cut by Hitchens’ Razor. I’m all for honest disagreement in the Marine Corps community, but criticism has to be constructive.

Back to the Future

What the critics got really, really wrong though is what the Marine Corps is supposed to be. The WOTR piece cited above does a good job laying out the legal perspective in terms of Title 10, but the critics appeal to the history of the Marine Corps also missed the mark. Their experience, roughly the Vietnam through Operation Iraqi Freedom period, is not in any way shape or form the historical norm for the Marine Corps. It was a historical aberration, one that led the Marine Corps to become far too close to being a second land Army. That had to change, and it should have changed sooner than it did. If FD2030 achieves nothing else, that alone is important. The Republic does not need a second land army. It does need an alternative to large-scale, Army-led unlimited wars. FD2030 is at least a start on that.

And history is on FD2030’s side. For most of its existence, the Marine Corps acted as an arm of the fleet, not an extra arm of the Army. It always did so when it had to, but supporting the Army or being a second army has never been the purpose the Marine Corps. It is there to support the fleets of the Navy. It did so hundreds of times in its early history, it has done so hundreds of times since.

FD2030, therefore, is a return to the historical norm, not a break from it. And it comes not a moment too soon. The shore-based threats to warships are increasing, as shown by the Yemen situation. The Navy is getting a lot of practice defending its ships right now, but the best defense is always a good offense. A U.S. Navy fleet commander has two ways and only two ways they can take the offense against shore-based threats: fires (missiles, carrier aviation, and a dwindling number of 5-inch guns) and Marines. They are increasingly going to need more of the latter.

The Missing Pieces

EABO, SIF, and the rest of the changes are one way the Marine Corps can get back to its historical role. Another, given the increasing threat from the PRC, is advocating to Congress that III MEF as the force that will bear the brunt of any PRC aggression be filled out and resourced with permanent vice rotational forces. (Would that Chowder II used their connections with Congress to help out with that!) But there are still two, in my opinion critical, pieces to make this all work. Both of these I’ve proposed before, so this is just a rehash.

The first is a lack of focus on security cooperation. The world is a lot more crowded than it was when the ships of Darius I established support bases on their way to their ass-kicking at Marathon. ALL Marine forces will be working with partnered forces in some way shape or form, and there’s only a few ANGLICOs that keep that mission alive (along with Civil Affairs and Advisor Companies in the reserves). There are different ways to do this, but none of them are being examined as far as I know.

The second is a lack of air integration. Of course, the Marine Corps has the ACE, but it can do more to tap into the Air Force as well. One of the primary goals of FD2030 is better naval integration (i.e. interoperability with the Navy) and that is definitely a high priority. But the Marine Corps also has to be interoperable with the Air Force. If the PLA does sweep into the Western Pacific and it has even a modicum of success, there are going to be places and regions that can only be contested by stand-in forces and the U.S. Air Force given the reach of some of their platforms. Making sure Marines on the surface and airmen in the skies can talk to each other and know what the other can bring to bear has to be done ahead of time.

The Joint Landscape

Speaking of other branches, the success of FD2030 is perhaps best measured by its influence on the joint force, considering there are still six years to go before its intended fruition. It survived the predictable attack from its Department of the Navy cohabitant, who then started its own effort, Force Design 2045. The Navy is rightfully leaning into uncrewed systems and robotics, but efforts will likely be limited as long as it remains committed to a carrier aviation centric force. I expect the Navy’s version to be far less bold.

The Army’s force design is still hush-hush, but I think 2035 is the target date. I expect that effort to be based on corps and division level multi-domain operations because the Army is already committed to that direction and there’s no reason to think they’ll about face. Maybe by 2035 we’ll know what the hell multi-domain operations is.

Meanwhile, there are only indications and warnings that something is afoot in the Air Force. The new CSAF is all-in on Combat Collaborative Aircraft (CCA), the only technology that I think could lead to something like real revolutionary change. The Air Force will likely go bold and benefit from CJCS top cover.

The Space Force is in the best position though. They’re currently working on their first force design and building out their first headquarters staff. They have a blank slate. Not a bad situation to be in.

Conclusion

We’re due another official FD2030 update in a few months, based on previous releases. This will be the first one heavily influenced by the new Commandant. It may become an inflection point between General Berger’s original vision and General Smith’s take based on what he saw as DC, CD&I and since he became Commandant. It will benefit not only from all the experimentation done in the last few years, but also from the data coming from Ukraine which has already made a mark on the effort.

These things can’t be done without tradeoffs: it’s impossible for the Marine Corps to change everything at once. But maybe they’ll be some room for some of the needed changes that haven’t gotten attention so far.