Things aren’t going great for Ukraine right now, or this year. They’ve defeated every inept Russian offensive so far, but their own offensive did not meet expectations. Sir Lawrence Freedman has covered this aspect, and General Mick Ryan recently looked at the prospect of a change in leadership for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. But as usual the maritime dimension receives less attention.
And it’s in the maritime dimension that Ukraine has achieved its biggest success this past year.
Russia’s vaunted Black Sea Fleet, already bereft of its flagship after Ukraine converted it to a submarine, has been restricted to the northeast corner of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. The Black Sea Fleet was forced to move a significant amount of naval assets from Sevastopol in occupied Crimea back to Russia proper. It’s still able to conduct some resupply to ground forces, but that’s about it. After this post was drafted, Ukraine sank a Russian guided missile corvette, the Ivanovets, with surface drones. The Ivanovets wasn’t even cruising in the Black Sea; it was hiding in Lake Danuslav, a protected saltwater inlet on the Crimean coast. It is the seventh Russian Navy ship sunk or destroyed since September. Fully 20% in terms of tonnage of the pre-war Black Sea Fleet has been destroyed by the Ukrainians.
Meanwhile, critical Ukrainian exports have almost reached pre-war levels, meaning Russian threats to cut off the grain supply and therefore critical funding for Ukraine have come to naught. A functioning Ukrainian economy is essential to continuing the war, so this is truly a strategic achievement.
How did a country without a navy deny key maritime terrain to a country with a navy? Through a maritime reconnaissance strike complex.
There are two components to any reconnaissance-strike complex: the reconnaissance part and the strike part. Ukraine uses aerial drones, satellite imagery, and presumably limited maritime radar assets to find targets, and it uses drones and missiles to strike. They strike not just Russian warships, but critical naval infrastructure as well. If Ukraine had a navy, or were they to rebuild one in the future, the sea denial achieved by the recon-strike complex can be translated into sea control as it provides maneuver space to friendly naval forces denied to the opponent.
There are a few implications of this Ukrainian success for maritime forces.
One, a maritime reconnaissance-strike force is clearly viable in the modern operating environment. Ukraine successfully built and employed one under duress on a shoe-string budget. This success confirms the primary goal of FD2030, something already noted in this article I pointed out earlier this week. A Marine Littoral Regiment combines already existing Marine Corps assets to create a maritime reconnaissance-strike complex. Expeditionary Advance Base Operations is the doctrine for emplacing, supporting, and moving these assets. All that remains to really tie the whole thing together is acquiring a surface connector for expeditionary mobility and logistics. That’s the Landing Ship, Medium. There have been a lot of allegations that FD2030 was not “validated” by analysis. Well it’s been validated by the real world now. Ukraine is even taking ideas directly from the Marine Corps, placing MLRS assets afloat, something the Marine Corps validated years ago.
Two, as I’ve mentioned before shore-based threats to ships are proliferating and increasingly capable. If Ukraine can do it, and Houthi rebels can do it, an established military employing the same tactics with more capable equipment can do it even better. And by an established military, I mean the PLARF.
Three, amphibious forces are critical to counter these threats. Russia has a naval infantry force, but they have been used as a land force instead of an amphibious force because they are one of the few units with a high level of training. Although at this point they’ve mostly been wrecked in poorly planned offensives. Russia lacks the ability to employ a maritime recon-strike campaign while also executing a terror bombing campaign in Ukraine itself, Ukrainian Marines have been employed elsewhere and are doing fine work.
So where does it go from here?
Navies take a long time to build and, given the strain on the Russian economy, rebuilding the Black Sea Fleet now isn’t likely. It will take decades, even if Putin committed the resources. Even if the war ended today. Russia’s only aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, has yet to recover from its defeat at the hands of its own dry dock. The Black Sea Fleet will suffer more losses at the hands of the Ukrainian recon-strike complex, or stay holed up in port. The Ukrainians have the maritime front well in hand for the foreseeable future.
As for the land front, Ukrainian Intelligence Director Kyrylo Budanov said that Russia has almost reached the end of its offensive potential. He is likely correct as Russia’s biggest problem is the inability to regenerate competent units. The reason for this is institutional. The Russian Army lacks a training and education system like the West where new recruits receive basic and then job-specific training before heading to an operational unit. All training has to be done on the job by the gaining unit itself. This means that the institutional knowledge is not housed back in Russia but on the front itself. Units have to simultaneously fight and train raw replacements rather than getting replacements that have a basic baseline of skills. Given the massive casualties that these units have suffered, the institutional knowledge is literally being killed off at the same time. The most experienced officers and senior enlisted are dead and more are dying every day. On-the-job training of conscripts and prisoners will suffice to mount a defense, and so it has. But it’s no way to generate offensive capable units. Even if they could generate competent soldiers, Russian stocks are so low that units are getting ancient T-55 tanks. None of this will change while Shoigu and Gerasimov are in charge.
The defense is the stronger form of war, but a Russian defense with no effective offensive component cannot stay in place forever, and will require more mobilization efforts. If the Ukrainians can solve their manpower problems, now’s the time for Ukraine’s allies to stop sending gear in fits and starts and open the floodgates. The EU seems to finally be stepping up to help out in its own backyard. But it’s gear and training that will let Ukraine generate the offensive power that Russia can’t.
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Thank goodness we gave them a blank check