You might have noticed I haven’t written anything in quite some time, which is true for Substack but not true for work and school. I’ve been unable to keep up with the weekly Amphibiosity format but also with periodic looks at other things in war. This is due to both a busy season at work (where most of my writing bandwidth goes) and my own masochistic decision to pursue a PhD. In other words, I’m entrenched behind too much work to write this thing as much as I’d like.
Also that PhD dissertation needs to be turned into a book at some point. Also someone has to write On Strategy. Also there’s another book in the disassociated form of other books on my shelf and archival records and something needs to be done about that.
Therefore, I am shifting strategy to turn this into a monthly newsletter like a longer version of the Amphibiosity posts. They’ll still focus on amphibious warfare but will have other stuff thrown in, but they’ll usually be shorter on commentary. This format will continue at least through May when I’ll be done with everything school-related except the dissertation. Then we’ll reassess. Also, I still have no plans to monetize. So I’m going to do my best to keep this thing afloat until then.
In Deep Ship
The Diplomat has a two-part series out on Chinese amphibious warfare by Andrew Erickson. The two parts are summations of Erickson’s recent massive edited volume Chinese Amphibious Warfare. Part 1 is here and Part 2 is here, but the book itself is also free at the link.
In other Chinese amphibious warfare news, the PRC has “launched” its new massive amphibious warship and dubbed it the Sichuan. “Launched” in the sense that they did a launch ceremony (pictured above) but they haven’t put it in water yet. The Sichuan is different not just for its size but for its optimization for aviation operations: it features a twin-island configuration like the Royal Navy’s HMS Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier as well as an electromagnetic catapult and arresting gear for larger fixed wing aircraft. Unlike the US Navy’s USS America class amphibious ships which are likewise optimized for naval aviation, the Sichuan also has a well deck for surface launches. In other words, when she does launch, she’ll be the most capable amphibious warship on the waves. What remains to be seen is whether or not the fixed-wing aircraft intended for the Sichuan will be manned or unmanned craft.
On the other side of the globe, the Italian Navy launched a new LHD, the Trieste.
Meanwhile, the US Navy has punted again on the LSM. First, Navy requirements have made the ship far more expensive than it needs to be, now they’re bulking at the inflated price. What the Navy needs to understand about amphibious warships, or any logistics ship since moving people is as much logistics as it is maneuver, is that their standards for ships of the battle fleet simply aren’t appropriate. Naval warfare needs fighting ships, but amphibious warfare needs the naval equivalent of trucks. Lots of them. If the amphibs are semis that can carry cargo and provide a decent living space for the driver, the LSM is an F-350 Super Duty. It doesn’t need fancy gadgets, it doesn’t need bells and whistles. It needs to carry lots of stuff. By trying to turn the LSM into some sleek exquisite ship, they’ve turned it into a Cybertruck: enormously overpriced and not as good as a base model pickup truck. The LSM is especially critical since the amphibs are falling apart just as fast as cybertrucks. When the Army is moving faster than the Navy on watercraft, you’ve got a serious problem.
Guys, just buy a damn work truck.
In Marine Corps news, Force Design continues apace and is finally starting to reach the fleet. 3rd MLR is now getting its kit. There’s also a new CRO report on the MLRs and a new Talent Management update out as well. The Tactical Notebook has a great post about Pete Ellis’ proposed landing regiments.
Bonus: Sir Lawrence Freedman, mandatory reading as far as I’m concerned, wrote a post on deterrence that is excellent. The more I spend time in DC the more I’m convinced our idea of deterrence is fundamentally flawed.
P.S. If you’re on the Substack app or Bluesky, I can usually be found there posting notes or skeets about the defense news of the day. Also baseball. If for some reason you just can’t handle a month between half-assed posts, find me there. If you used to follow me on Twitter or Facebook, I’m never on there anymore and since they’re rapidly becoming AI slop delivery services, won’t be in the future.
America’s strategy of deterrence and preserving the status quo comes down again to the same issues other we faced in previous war as America found itself pursuing negative war aims instead of positive outcomes which makes it hard for the population to continue to support the war effort.
But that brings me to the question, if American were to go to war against China, what positive war aims can we expect to achieve when it comes to China?