There are frequent debates about the future of the tank, most of which are more pedantry than substance. There are fewer debates about the future of the infantry.
When I hit my first unit in December of 2000, we were still being issued the Vietnam era flak jackets and ALICE packs. Surely they were newer ones, but they were the same model. The flak jacket sucked, but I still prefer an ALICE pack over anything else. After I commissioned in 2005 and became an artillery officer, I still worked closely with infantry units. So I saw a lot of changes over the years.
But more change is coming. So this will be an ongoing series on the future of the infantry as I periodically have thoughts and/or find a good discussion. Like the one in the latest issue of Proceedings by Major Michael Hanson.
The bulk of Hanson’s piece is devoted to equipping infantry with emerging technologies: drones, loitering munitions, and small-unit air defense. He does not argue against adopting these technologies, but rather that they should not displace the vital suppressive fire role of rifles and machineguns. He’s certainly correct. The suppressive effect of rapid direct fire has not been replaced by anything else. (By suppression, we mean firing a large number of rounds at an enemy position to prevent them from moving and/or firing back effectively. Fixing an enemy position in this way enables flanking attacks or other small-unit tactics.)
Hanson says the purpose of the infantry- to close with and destroy the enemy- will not change. I’m not sure that this is still a good representation of the role of infantry though. It is certainly to close with an enemy, but infantry has not been the most destructive force on the battlefield for well over a century. Since the development of indirect fire, artillery has gained and maintained that role. This does not seem likely to change anytime soon even as the role of artillery is played by different types of systems like rocket artillery and the aforementioned loitering munitions.
Rather, the role of infantry and all types of maneuver forces may become more exploitation of the effects of long-range fires in the offense. It’s role in the defense, “repel the enemy’s assault through fire and close combat,” will likely remain unchanged. But there needs to be a method to exploit the effects of fires, which are always ephemeral. Suppressive fire will be needed in both offensive and defensive applications of exploitation.
Traditionally, this was the role of cavalry. Then it passed to tanks. Tanks are good for exploitation phases but only the infantry can hold gains made through exploitation. And as armor becomes more vulnerable, it will have to operate with infantry anyway. So we may just see a move towards even more merging of armor and infantry. In fact we may already be seeing it.
The IDF has employed fires against Hamas in Gaza for a few weeks now. Not with any particularly decisive effects and seemingly not with great care, but fire combat is never decisive anyway. Close combat is, and here the IDF exploited the disruption of the fire combat phase (which drove Hamas into their tunnel networks) to seize key terrain with armor and mechanized infantry through close combat.
As the picture above shows, the IDF also seems to be bringing in a degree of the defense to their offense (always a good idea) by forming laagers or wagon forts with their armored vehicles. This is a smart tactic in Gaza and when employing armored vehicles with excellent defense systems. However, it’s only smart because Hamas lacks sustained fire support from tube artillery. There are no defenses against enough HE rounds and this kind of concentration elsewhere would be suicidal.
If the role of infantry does become one of exploiting the effects of long-range precision fires, there will be follow-on changes to the infantry once the best way to accomplish this is ascertained. I expect that to be a bottom-up process: grunts will receive new weaponry and then work out how best to use it. These changes won’t just be in equipment, however.
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Certainly armor is going the way of the battleship. Maybe the Aircraft Carrier as well. Artillery is called the king of battle for a reason (obviously you know this). However look at some major fights against well dig in enemy positions. Hamburger Hill for example. We dropped amazing amounts of fires on those positions. It took infantry to clear them still.
The increasing vulnerability of armour represents a shift toward manoeuvre warfare breaking down at the hands of technological advancements (drones and associated munitions). Improved air defences integrated into combined arms platforms will restore the balance to battlefield mobility.
Both sides are facing this issue in Ukraine and are searching for the tools to break the deadlock/static front lines.