The Amphibious Dimensions of the Russo-Ukraine War

To the shores of Crimea

BJ Armstrong wrote in War On The Rocks earlier this year that, while the ongoing Russo-Ukraine War appears to be a land war, there is a significant maritime dimension. This is true not just for the military dimension but for the economic dimension as well. Products from Ukraine are shipped via sea all around the world. Russia’s invasion, therefore, threatens the food security of the entire world seeing as global food security depends on maritime commerce. Access to and control over the Black Sea, a Russian geopolitical goal for centuries, seems once again to be a center of gravity. 

Where there are naval dimensions there are amphibious opportunities. This is a truism going back as far back in naval history as we can tell. The First Persian War ended with the Athenian defeat of a Persian expeditionary force at the Battle of Marathon in 490 BC, but the Persians only got that far by executing an island-hopping campaign through the Aegean Sea. They raided or conquered Rhodes, Naxos, and a number of islands in the Cyclades, and Euboea before eventually landing in Attica. 

So too in the Russo-Ukraine War. In fact, there were amphibious operations from the very first day of the war. The Black Sea Fleet had two amphibious task groups ready to land ahead of Russian Army forces as they advanced. That is, until things started to go poorly. Now, though, the opportunities for amphibious operations are greater. But not for Russia. For Ukraine. 

Fuck You, Russian EABO 

On the first day of the war, two Russian warships seized Snake Island, located 35 kilometers east of the mouth of the Danube, where the border of Ukraine and Romania meet. If you want to achieve sea control off the shore of Ukraine, Snake Island is the westernmost lynchpin by virtue of its location. It is key maritime terrain. The side that controls it can place anti-ship or anti-air platforms there and project sea and air denial from it without tying ships down to a specific location while simultaneously providing support for naval force projection elsewhere. That kind of naval maneuverability is what underpins the USMC’s expeditionary advance base operations (EABO) concept, but it’s really nothing new. The Persians using amphibious forces to support naval projection across the Aegean mentioned above is the same idea. 

Except it didn’t go so well for Russia. First, the Ukrainian border guard post on the island transmitted, “Fuck you, Russian warship,” to the Moskva. While the border guards were captured after the Russians landed, the retort was a strategic communication coup for Ukraine as it became a global rallying cry of defiance. The Moskva did in fact fuck off to the bottom of the Black Sea on 14 April 2022 after being hit by Ukrainian anti-ship missiles. The border guards were later released back to Ukraine during a prisoner swap. 

Russia began moving its own weapon systems onto Snake Island but Ukraine managed to deny its use via long-range fires. From February to the end of June, Russia repeatedly attempted to land forces and equipment, all of which were bombarded by Ukrainian fires from the mainland. Russia finally gave up as a “goodwill gesture.” 

Ukrainian A2AD

Sea control, even more than air control, is necessary for amphibious operations. But it is also necessary for Ukraine’s economic livelihood. To that end, Ukraine intended to develop an anti-access, area-denial capability in the form of coastal defense battalions equipped with Ukrainian-designed “Mineral-U” radar systems and “Neptune” anti-ship missiles. This system was intended to be ready in April 2022 and therefore was not operational when the war began. However, the units that have since been able to reach full readiness have been effective: it was one of these battalions that sank the Moskva which forced the Black Sea Fleet to operate further away from Ukrainian-controlled territory, establishing sea denial in the northwestern part of the Black Sea. 

Extending that A2AD complex will depend on future Russian withdrawals, but Ukraine has already begun augmenting it with Ukrainian designed unmanned surface vessels. These USVs debuted in late October conducting a surprise attack on the Black Sea Fleet vessels in Sevastopol. Little outright damage was done, but the attack demonstrated the vulnerability of the Black Sea Fleet to Ukrainian attacks, which will restrict their movements even more. 

Kinburn Spit 

As Ukrainian forces deny more and more sea maneuver space to the Black Sea Fleet and the Russian ships themselves require more maintenance, Ukraine will have more opportunities for amphibious operations. Which brings us to the Kinburn Spit amphibious operation which may or may not have occurred. Forbes claimed that this attack is confirmed but I have not seen the most reliable experts Rob Lee and Michael Kofman confirm it yet. 

Allegedly Ukrainian special forces crossed from the Ukrainian mainland to a small spit of land on Crimea called Kinburn Spit. The rumors were accompanied by videos of said commandos in boats on some body of water and insinuations by official Ukrainian government accounts that the operation was indeed occurring. If it did occur and the commandos stayed to defend the territory they took, it would be classified as an amphibious assault (an attack with no planned withdrawal to seize and hold territory). If they landed, caused some hate and discontent among Russian forces in the area, and then left, it would be classified as an amphibious raid (an attack with a planned withdrawal not intended to hold an objective). If no operation occurred, but Ukrainian troops were loaded on boats to make it look like an operation occurred, then it would be classified as an amphibious demonstration. These types of amphibious operations are defined in JP 3-02 Joint Amphibious Operations. 

The other possible, albeit unfortunate possibility, is that this operation occurred but was not successful, in which case the Ukrainian government likely would not publicize it. 

The Role of Amphibious Operations in the Coming Liberation of the Crimea

Whether the Kinburn Spit operation occurred or not, the different possibilities mentioned above are relevant for what Ukraine can do to liberate Crimea itself. 

Many doubt that such a liberation is possible. Others simply say that amphibious operations are “pretty much out of the question,” like Mark Cancian in this DefenseOne piece. Such assessments are usually based on the fact that Ukraine lacks both the amphibious warships and the armored ship-to-shore connectors which are necessary for large-scale, opposed amphibious assaults. As we’ve seen above, amphibious operations can take many other forms that are not as dependent on the exquisite, purpose designed platforms that major navies employ. Plenty of amphibious operations are performed with just small boats and daring men. 

But what can Ukraine actually accomplish with smaller scale assaults and other forms of amphibious operations, especially as part of a larger joint effort? Quite a bit. While the landing force is generally limited in terms of combat power and dependent on what can be landed with it or behind it, the use of the sea as maneuver space makes amphibious forces extremely flexible. The defender can only successfully defending by correctly predicting where the landing force will land. Even if one tries to defend everywhere, say by building Fortress Europe, there will still be weaker spots that the amphibious force can exploit especially if paired with successful deception. Successful defenses therefore have to guess correctly or commit major resources to defending every possible landing point and both options still might fail. Amphibious forces thus tend to produce a strategic effect above their tactical weight. 

There are two major ways that Ukrainian amphibious forces- be they special forces or the Ukrainian Marine Corps- can exploit this. Via amphibious raids or via amphibious assaults in support of land offensives. The first option can focus on attacking and damaging Russian forces throughout the coastal regions of the peninsula: air defense, artillery, and whatever security forces can be identified. Such raids do not have to cause a lot of actual damage, even in aggregate. Such raids will force Russia to commit ground forces all around the peninsula, not just along the key land lines of communication, overstretching their already strained manpower and logistics systems. 

Second, should a land campaign occur in the future, amphibious forces can be landed behind Russian lines to outflank them. This was the primary role of Soviet naval infantry, and remains the primary role of Russian Federation naval infantry, by doctrine. The Ukrainian Marine Corps is likely quite familiar with the role and should shine when employed as such, provided they can be spared from augmenting the Ukrainian ground forces as they have since the beginning of the war. 

Both options play to the demonstrated strengths of the Ukrianian forces- small unit combined arms maneuver- and the demonstrated weaknesses of the Russian forces- lack of manpower, lack of combined arms coordination, and slow, centralized command and control- since the beginning of the war. Both options force Russia to defend all of Crimea, not just parts of it. If they try to focus on the land lines of communication and hold those, they will be outmaneuvered from the rear. Either they have to spread their already thin forces all around the coast or else guess where the Ukrainians will land. The latter is what they did in the Crimean War in 1854, arraying their army to stop a British/French landing at Katchka. Instead, the landing occurred at Yevpatoria. Once the British and French had access to the peninsula, the damage was done and the Russians had to face the invaders on equal terms. A number of major battles were fought along the peninsula, but the Allies succeeded in overcoming the Russian forces at the Siege of Sevastopol which ended in September 1855. 

Conclusion

Despite skepticism in Washington, people actually in Crimea seem to know a liberation of some kind is coming. On the surface, it would seem that defending the peninsula is easy, especially against the Ukrainians who have no real navy at this point. However, what seems easy isn’t so for the Russians. Whether they choose to concentrate their remaining (and dwindling) combat power to defeat a land attack or attempt to cover down around the peninsula to forestall amphibious raids, they leave an opening that the Ukrainians can exploit. 

Just the existence of an amphibious capability places the defender in a number of dilemmas of this sort. Virtually the only route to success for the Russians is to successfully predict where a Ukrainian attack is going to occur and defeating it, an outcome that would profoundly harm Ukrainian strategy. This can work where an invader is limited to a very small number of very predictable landing points like, say, Taiwan. But this is not true of Ukraine.

The amphibious operations that have already occurred also indicate that the U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Advance Base Operations concept, a major part of Force Design 2030, is highly relevant in modern warfare. The seizure of Snake Island was a primary, day one objective for Russia for its potential as an expeditionary advance base. Ukraine put a lot of resources into successfully denying Russia’s ability to exploit it for the same reason. Both sides employed the exact kind of capabilities that the U.S. Marine Corps is seeking to invest in.

 

Views expressed herein are my own and do not represent the views of any employer, client, or government entity.