Good points. Ukrainian engineering has tipped the defense/ offense scales back to WWI levels. The era of AFV/air support breakthroughs that the Germans introduced 80 years ago is over.
Agree on infantry, despite being a Chinese C4ISR/long-range kill chain analyst. Ukraine reminds us that drones and missiles can’t finish the job without people holding the line, and Taiwan’s new reserve plans lean on that lesson. The U.S. shift toward smaller, networked teams that still call big fires seems like the right answer—interested in your view of how far we can push that. https://ordersandobservations.substack.com/
You actually believe that an MLR with its LCT, which is nothing more than a light infantry battalion, could confront any of those PLA amphibious combined arms brigades? And do you actually believe the MLR has any utility other than adding some long-range fires if sent to the Republic of Korea to help counter an invasion from the north? Where is this RCT you mention going to come from? I and II MEF have infantry regiments but no capabilities to add any units with combat power except HIMARS unless you pull M-777 batteries from the MEU rotation. There are no armor or engineer units to create such a combat team. Again, Force Design 2030 turned the stateside infantry regiments into light infantry units. Without sufficient amphibious or MPF ships how is this supposed RCT—if it existed—to move from CONUS to WestPac? Finally, do you not think it terms of Marine Air Ground Task Forces or are you strictly an infantry-oriented guy.
I suggest you study the best book written on ground combat since World War II, Ben Connable’s “Ground Combat: Puncturing the Myth of Modern War.” This will give you a better foundation upon which to write and present meaningful arguments.
You actually believe that an MLR with its LCT, which is nothing more than a light infantry battalion, could confront any of those PLA amphibious combined arms brigades? And do you actually believe the MLR has any utility other than adding some long-range fires if sent to the Republic of Korea to help counter an invasion from the north? Where is this RCT you mention going to come from? I and II MEF have infantry regiments but no capabilities to add any units with combat power except HIMARS unless you pull M-777 batteries from the MEU rotation. There are no armor or engineer units to create such a combat team. Again, Force Design 2030 turned the stateside infantry regiments into light infantry units. Without sufficient amphibious or MPF ships how is this supposed RCT—if it existed—to move from CONUS to WestPac? Finally, do you not think it terms of Marine Air Ground Task Forces or are you strictly an infantry-oriented guy.
I suggest you study the best book written on ground combat since World War II, Ben Connable’s “Ground Combat: Puncturing the Myth of Modern War.” This will give you a better foundation upon which to write and present meaningful arguments.
No, I'm saying the PLA has no intention or capability to deploy those amphibious combined arms brigades to a place where the MLRs are intended to be used. You seem to be basing all of this on some scenario where the MLR is fighting a regiment-sized element or larger in ground warfare; attrition warfare style. That is not what they are for, that is not how they are intended to be used.
The MLRs are an application maneuver warfare: fires support maneuver. In the case of the MLR, the primary maneuver element they support are U.S. Navy surface ships; sea space denied to the enemy becomes maneuver space for friendly forces. If there's a maneuver force on land, it can also provide air defense, long-range fires, and ISR to augment that maneuver force's organic capabilities. It's also more historically grounded: the Marine Corps has performed sea control/sea denial tasks in naval campaigns for the bulk of its history, including World War II. Ground warfare, legally and historically, is a secondary mission.
And I've met Ben. We've talked about his book. Its database contains only instances of ground warfare, not naval warfare. It actually doesn't apply to the question of MLRs at all because they're not primarily for ground combat. They're for naval warfare. The question of what they would do in a fight against an enemy regiment is totally irrelevant. If the threat is an enemy combined arms regiment on the ground, then a ground force is called. And yes the Marine Corps can still do that.
I will say this: the Marine Corps has done a horrible, horrible job explaining both the purpose of the MLRs and what the wider Force Design effort has accomplished so far. That was a huge mistake and there doesn't seem to be any intention of fixing that poor communication. But the idea that MLRs are going to be out there fighting PLA ground brigades throughout the Pacific or that the Marine Corps has divested from combined arms isn't true at all. Force Design has touched less than 1/3 of the force, especially since 12th Marines was really just a HQ with no non-rotational forces anyway. Now that we're halfway through this thing and the DoD intends to accelerate it, I for one think it's about time the Marine Corps starts talking about it.
You appear to discount the importance of multiple maneuver elements under one headquarters able to operate in support of each other. This is particularly true with regard to the Littoral Combat Team, which is of marginal utility because it resides alone outside of an infantry regiment with multiple battalions. You also seem to disregard the importance of supporting arms able to bring high volumes of fires in close to maneuvering infantry, something missiles cannot do.
First, the PLA does not currently have the capacity to deploy and sustain units larger than a battalion outside China except for the 6 amphibious Combined Arms Brigades that are solely dedicated to Taiwan. There's no potential threat in the Philippines or Japan that would require that large of a maneuver unit unless they're invading one of those countries instead of Taiwan, at which point you wouldn't send an MLR but a regular line unit. Second, even if they develop that capability in the future, there's nothing stopping the Marine Corps from deploying an RCT alongside the MLR. Nothing in any FD document says or assumes that the MLRs will be the only units forward.
I think the best way to envision the role of the MLR is akin to DIVARTY in the Army. DIVARTY provides general support and reinforcing fires to augment BCT level fires. But an MLR, as a “MEF ARTY” can do more than just that, like anti-ship, anti-air, ISR, and joint ISR/C-ISR
Yes, and if the 38th commandant had been thinking straight he would have created a general support missile battalion within the 12th Marines and 3rd Marine Division could have task organized for the anti-ship mission. The Corps has never purpose-organized operational units in the past; it has always task organized.
That’s almost exactly what happened: 12th MLR is a fires heavy MLR, 3rd MLR is not. Also, it’s not true that the Corps has never had purpose-organized formations. The machine gun battalions of WW1 and the assault and defense battalions of WW2 were purpose-organized. The Marine Corps has more history as a purpose-designed force than a task-organized force (although I think it should not go beyond the level of purpose-designed forces it has planned now, which is only three regiment about 3 regiments).
The Russians being roundly mocked has had some negative consequences for our field/our ability to analyze the war in Ukraine. Perhaps they are not using motorcycles solely because they are idiots.
Good points. Ukrainian engineering has tipped the defense/ offense scales back to WWI levels. The era of AFV/air support breakthroughs that the Germans introduced 80 years ago is over.
Agree on infantry, despite being a Chinese C4ISR/long-range kill chain analyst. Ukraine reminds us that drones and missiles can’t finish the job without people holding the line, and Taiwan’s new reserve plans lean on that lesson. The U.S. shift toward smaller, networked teams that still call big fires seems like the right answer—interested in your view of how far we can push that. https://ordersandobservations.substack.com/
Force design is gay.
You actually believe that an MLR with its LCT, which is nothing more than a light infantry battalion, could confront any of those PLA amphibious combined arms brigades? And do you actually believe the MLR has any utility other than adding some long-range fires if sent to the Republic of Korea to help counter an invasion from the north? Where is this RCT you mention going to come from? I and II MEF have infantry regiments but no capabilities to add any units with combat power except HIMARS unless you pull M-777 batteries from the MEU rotation. There are no armor or engineer units to create such a combat team. Again, Force Design 2030 turned the stateside infantry regiments into light infantry units. Without sufficient amphibious or MPF ships how is this supposed RCT—if it existed—to move from CONUS to WestPac? Finally, do you not think it terms of Marine Air Ground Task Forces or are you strictly an infantry-oriented guy.
I suggest you study the best book written on ground combat since World War II, Ben Connable’s “Ground Combat: Puncturing the Myth of Modern War.” This will give you a better foundation upon which to write and present meaningful arguments.
You actually believe that an MLR with its LCT, which is nothing more than a light infantry battalion, could confront any of those PLA amphibious combined arms brigades? And do you actually believe the MLR has any utility other than adding some long-range fires if sent to the Republic of Korea to help counter an invasion from the north? Where is this RCT you mention going to come from? I and II MEF have infantry regiments but no capabilities to add any units with combat power except HIMARS unless you pull M-777 batteries from the MEU rotation. There are no armor or engineer units to create such a combat team. Again, Force Design 2030 turned the stateside infantry regiments into light infantry units. Without sufficient amphibious or MPF ships how is this supposed RCT—if it existed—to move from CONUS to WestPac? Finally, do you not think it terms of Marine Air Ground Task Forces or are you strictly an infantry-oriented guy.
I suggest you study the best book written on ground combat since World War II, Ben Connable’s “Ground Combat: Puncturing the Myth of Modern War.” This will give you a better foundation upon which to write and present meaningful arguments.
No, I'm saying the PLA has no intention or capability to deploy those amphibious combined arms brigades to a place where the MLRs are intended to be used. You seem to be basing all of this on some scenario where the MLR is fighting a regiment-sized element or larger in ground warfare; attrition warfare style. That is not what they are for, that is not how they are intended to be used.
The MLRs are an application maneuver warfare: fires support maneuver. In the case of the MLR, the primary maneuver element they support are U.S. Navy surface ships; sea space denied to the enemy becomes maneuver space for friendly forces. If there's a maneuver force on land, it can also provide air defense, long-range fires, and ISR to augment that maneuver force's organic capabilities. It's also more historically grounded: the Marine Corps has performed sea control/sea denial tasks in naval campaigns for the bulk of its history, including World War II. Ground warfare, legally and historically, is a secondary mission.
And I've met Ben. We've talked about his book. Its database contains only instances of ground warfare, not naval warfare. It actually doesn't apply to the question of MLRs at all because they're not primarily for ground combat. They're for naval warfare. The question of what they would do in a fight against an enemy regiment is totally irrelevant. If the threat is an enemy combined arms regiment on the ground, then a ground force is called. And yes the Marine Corps can still do that.
I will say this: the Marine Corps has done a horrible, horrible job explaining both the purpose of the MLRs and what the wider Force Design effort has accomplished so far. That was a huge mistake and there doesn't seem to be any intention of fixing that poor communication. But the idea that MLRs are going to be out there fighting PLA ground brigades throughout the Pacific or that the Marine Corps has divested from combined arms isn't true at all. Force Design has touched less than 1/3 of the force, especially since 12th Marines was really just a HQ with no non-rotational forces anyway. Now that we're halfway through this thing and the DoD intends to accelerate it, I for one think it's about time the Marine Corps starts talking about it.
You appear to discount the importance of multiple maneuver elements under one headquarters able to operate in support of each other. This is particularly true with regard to the Littoral Combat Team, which is of marginal utility because it resides alone outside of an infantry regiment with multiple battalions. You also seem to disregard the importance of supporting arms able to bring high volumes of fires in close to maneuvering infantry, something missiles cannot do.
First, the PLA does not currently have the capacity to deploy and sustain units larger than a battalion outside China except for the 6 amphibious Combined Arms Brigades that are solely dedicated to Taiwan. There's no potential threat in the Philippines or Japan that would require that large of a maneuver unit unless they're invading one of those countries instead of Taiwan, at which point you wouldn't send an MLR but a regular line unit. Second, even if they develop that capability in the future, there's nothing stopping the Marine Corps from deploying an RCT alongside the MLR. Nothing in any FD document says or assumes that the MLRs will be the only units forward.
I think the best way to envision the role of the MLR is akin to DIVARTY in the Army. DIVARTY provides general support and reinforcing fires to augment BCT level fires. But an MLR, as a “MEF ARTY” can do more than just that, like anti-ship, anti-air, ISR, and joint ISR/C-ISR
Yes, and if the 38th commandant had been thinking straight he would have created a general support missile battalion within the 12th Marines and 3rd Marine Division could have task organized for the anti-ship mission. The Corps has never purpose-organized operational units in the past; it has always task organized.
That’s almost exactly what happened: 12th MLR is a fires heavy MLR, 3rd MLR is not. Also, it’s not true that the Corps has never had purpose-organized formations. The machine gun battalions of WW1 and the assault and defense battalions of WW2 were purpose-organized. The Marine Corps has more history as a purpose-designed force than a task-organized force (although I think it should not go beyond the level of purpose-designed forces it has planned now, which is only three regiment about 3 regiments).
is this the raid system the IDF tried in gaza?
I haven’t seen anything on an ISF raid system. Got a link?
The Russians being roundly mocked has had some negative consequences for our field/our ability to analyze the war in Ukraine. Perhaps they are not using motorcycles solely because they are idiots.
Yeah I don’t think that’s dumb it’s a revival of dragoon tactics.
https://open.substack.com/pub/bafriedman/p/the-future-of-the-infantry-vi?r=gvxj&utm_medium=ios
The IN is called the Queen of Battle for a reason