The word attrition is on a lot of people’s minds these days, as well it should be. The ongoing Russian offensive against Bakhmut in Ukraine seems to be petering out, mostly due to an immense amount of casualties inflicted by a staunch and brave Ukrainian defense. Attrition is usually presented as the polar opposite of maneuver and there is now an ongoing debate about whether or not attrition or maneuver is occurring in Ukraine. The best take on this so far is this one by Rob Lee and Michael Kofman at FPRI.
I don’t much like the attrition/maneuver dichotomy for a few reasons. In the Marine Corps Gazette in 2014 I argued that any rewrite of MCDP-1 Warfighting should remove it. One reason for this was that I didn’t believe anyone was dumb enough to act like the strawman “attritionist” presented in Warfighting but it seems I grossly overestimated the Russian Armed Forces. In On Operations, I included it as a way that operations staffs might conceptualize their tactics, but as one option among others.
Another reason is that the difference doesn’t really tell you much when it comes to strategy, and most people use the term attrition as a term for a strategy i.e. “war of attrition.” Wars can be characterized by their intent as wars of compellence or deterrence, and Russia has launched a war of compellence in Ukraine. They can also be characterized by aim as limited or unlimited, and Russia has launched an unlimited war in Ukraine. Whether Russia intended to absorb Ukraine itself or simply install a compliant and dependence regime in Kyiv is immaterial: the aim is to end Ukraine’s existence as a free and independent state. That they are attempting to fight an unlimited war with extremely limited means- relative to the size, capability, allies, and will of that state- is very problematic for Russia.
Attrition warfare versus maneuver warfare is not about war but about warfare. They are different styles of fighting and therefore tactical. They are two competing theories of victory over an opposing force or, to use a much better term, defeat mechanisms. Each squarely addresses “the theory of the use of military forces in combat”- tactics- rather than “the theory of the use of combats for the object of the war”- strategy- in Clausewitz’s terms. Attrition warfare is defined in MCDP-1 Warfighting as a style of warfare that,
“pursues victory through the cumulative destruction of the enemy's material assets by superior firepower. it is a direct approach to the conduct of war that sees war as a straightforward test of strength and a matter principally of force ratios. An enemy is seen as a collection of targets to be engaged and destroyed systematically. Enemy concentrations are sought out as the most worthwhile targets. The logical conclusion of attrition warfare is the eventual physical destruction of the enemy's entire arsenal, although the expectation is that the enemy will surrender or disengage before this happens out of unwillingness to bear the rising cost. The focus is on the efficient application of fires, leading to a highly proceduralized approach to war. Technical proficiency—especially in weapons employment—matters more than cunning or creativity.”
What this boils down to is not that attrition warfare is characterized just by the fact that attrition is occurring, but rather that attrition is the defeat mechanism by which one side intends to win, usually by attriting the enemy’s strong points. Maneuver warfare, which will be covered in a future FFE post, intends to defeat the enemy by maneuvering against the enemy’s weak points, leaving strong points isolated and unsupported.
The terms however have led to a lot of confusion because, and MCDP-1 is upfront about this, attrition and maneuver co-exist. Maneuvering against weak points still requires causing attrition of those weak points. Even then isolated and hypothetically less functional strong points will usually need to be attrited as well, it’s just easier to do once they are isolated. Attrition warfare will also usually feature maneuvers of some sort to create the conditions for the destruction of an opposing force.
The ongoing Russo-Ukraine War demonstrates this confusion and how the terms don’t help a great deal. As it stands, both sides have inflicted about 100,000 casualties on each other. But by the definitions presented in MCDP-1, only Russia is pursuing attrition warfare. Their tactics around Bakhmut especially demonstrate an attrition warfare mindset. Russian forces use a highly centralized and inflexible chain of command and very direct, simplistic attacks unconcerned about how many casualties they incur. Elsewhere in the country, Russian operations have been characterized by widescale destruction and the deliberate targeting of civilians. By all accounts, the Ukrainian Forces do not act like this. Instead, subordinate commanders are empowered to make decisions. NCOs and officers are being trained by NATO military forces. The ingenuity that has been the hallmark of Ukraine’s resistance so far is the result of empowered low-level leaders, a necessary ingredient of maneuver warfare. This also shows in Ukrainian tactics. As Lee and Kofman mentioned in their article above, it was attrition that opened a window for Ukrainian maneuver. But recognizing such opportunities requires the right mindset among the leaders at the tactical edge. A “maneuver” mindset.
But again, recognizing these tactical styles doesn’t tell us much about the war. Russia might be eerily similar to the rhetorical presentation of attrition warfare in MCDP-1, but they are continuing to cause an immense amount of damage for Ukraine. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have done an amazing job at adapting maneuver warfare, but Russia’s mobilization has stabilized the front and reduced the available options for Ukrainian maneuver. Wars are won through strategy, and it remains to be seen which side’s tactics will better contribute to their strategy.