Having identified doctrine’s distinction from theory, role in the strategy process, its ingredients, its function as a bridge between theory and practice, and an example from the Royal Navy along with how it was promulgated, I’m now going to confirm this line of thinking by applying that frame to MCDP-1 Warfighting for the simple reason that it’s the doctrine that I’m most familiar with. The rest of my PhD research will be looking at the development of Anglo-American amphibious warfare doctrine over the centuries leading up to World War II. My thesis here is that the ability of the British and Americans to execute opposed amphibious assaults at scale in World War II was not just the result of innovations during the Interwar Period but rather the culmination of a centuries-long tradition developed by the British and then passed to the Americans through the colonization process. The eventual book will also look at Imperial Japan, the only other actor in World War II to effectively execute amphibious assaults at scale, and whether or not their alliance with the United Kingdom involved a similar passing of the amphibious torch. I’m a few years away from that though so an examination of MCDP-1 will have to suffice for now.
Like doctrine itself, how doctrines are formed and transmitted will be highly idiosyncratic across military organizations. However a military organization’s doctrine is formulated and promulgated, it seems to consist of at least three major components: 1) a preferred command philosophy; 2) a preferred tactical system; and 3) a preferred organizational structure. They may include a lot more, such as training and education practices, but at a minimum it needs to describe how the force fights, how the force is organized to fight, and who gets to make the decisions. What those preferences are is the outcome of many factors, including long-term cultural, social, and geopolitical structural factors as well as more fluid factors like weapons technology, economic trends, and the strategic situation at hand.
We can see these three components in the research done by Geoffrey Sloan on the Royal Navy. Officers were indoctrinated into the Royal Navy’s way of war in three primary ways: 1) what they were taught by senior officers and instructors; 2) the “fighting instructions” promulgated by fleet commanders; and 3) formal doctrine promulgated by the Admiralty. This produced Royal Navy officers that perfected line of battle naval tactics (their preferred tactical system), decentralized command and subordinate officers that took initiative (their preferred command philosophy), and a whole host of regulations regarding how fleets were organized while afloat (their preferred organization). It was this doctrine that forged the Royal Navy into a sword that dominated the seas for centuries and produced- among many other fine commanders- the paragon of Royal Navy combat leadership Horatio Nelson.
It’s completely unsurprising that all of the elements are present in MCDP-1 Warfighting. The first two chapters are discussions of theory that build an argument for why the Marine Corps’ doctrine should be designed a certain way. Chapters three and four are the actual doctrinal components of the document. Chapter three is titled “Preparing for War” and chapter four is titled “The Conduct of War,” a distinction first made by Clausewitz. The “Preparing for War” chapter discusses institution building activities like training, education, acquisitions, etc. It’s in chapter four where the actual Marine Corps way of war, the real meat of combat doctrine is presented. It reiterates the Marine Corps version of maneuver warfare (which is quite distinct from others), discusses combined arms (its preferred tactical system), mission command (its preferred command philosophy), and how both apply to the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (its preferred organization). In other words, chapter three describes how the Marine Corps forges the sword that is described in chapter four.
Interestingly, MCDP-1 Warfighting makes an ideal example of doctrine as a bridge between theory and practice- as per Sloan- because it does so in written form: starting with general strategic theory and tracing that through institution building to its preferred tactical system, command philosophy, and institutional organization. This bridge is less clear in other examples where the link between theory and practice is left unstated in ink. MCDP-1 therefore is a particularly stark example.
This closes out my discussion of naval doctrine for now. Ideally, I would like to apply this to the Navy’s current Force Design 2045 effort, but all of the aspects of it are not yet public and may never be. If that changes I may pick this series back up. For now, it’s time to apply these ideas to the history of Anglo-American amphibious warfare and detect where they began and how they arose. But all of that is for the dissertation itself.
As always, thoughtful and taught.