Dispatch from the Trenches II
Amphibious Warfare news and notes
This month we start with the good news: Asia Pacific nations are gearing up for amphibious warfare to repel China. This includes Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan. India would like to get in on the action, but their border with China necessarily takes priority. The last navy to figure out that there’s no fight in the Pacific without amphibious warfare is the U.S. Navy. Fortunately, we’re buying amphibs anyway. And improving the economy in the process.
In Marine Corps news, here’s a deep dive on F-35B operations in the Pacific.
The Army validated maritime transport of its Typhon missile system. Translation: they put it on a commercial ship. This is necessary to get it to Hawaii, solutions to get it any further west than that are hopefully forthcoming. The next step is likely validating it for amphibious shipping but even if that occurs, it’s unlikely that any amphibs will be available for this mission.
Lastly, here’s an oldie-but-a-goodie. Friend of FFE and mandatory reading as far as I’m concerned wrote this piece on how Clausewitz’s conception of alliances highlights how important alliance building and maintaining is so for the U.S. approach to Taiwan.
The bonus topic this month is a pair of Air Force focused articles I found interesting.
In the above article, Tony Carr takes a look at recent general officer leadership in the USAF. Saying we need new generals is so hot right now but this critique actually has substance. Tony describes how general officers tend to be beholden to the budget process to the extent that nothing besides interservice knife fights actually get done. Tony has a lot more USAF experience than my paltry three years working on the Air Staff, but I got this sense during my time there as well. I’d only add that this is by no means an Air Force only problem.
The other article is by Jonathan Rice at Over the Horizon Journal on the Air Force’s concept of reconnaissance. In On Operations, I tried to make the point that lumping reconnaissance in with intelligence and surveillance is problematic: these are three distinct missions/functions that work together, but viewing them as one mission obscures the different dynamics of each. Jonathan identifies this problem in an Air Force context and proposes important changes. Once again, this is by no means an Air Force only problem.